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KIDDIE PORN IN THE GALLERY: DEFENDING THE ARTIST'S
CORPUS OR INVADING THE CORPORAL
INTEGRITY OF THE SUBJECT
I. INTRODUCTION
The mid-twentieth century American proto-Pop artist Larry
Rivers produced a few shocking, controversial works during his ca-
reer.' Rivers offended polite society in 1964 when he crafted his
own version of the Jacques Louis David portrait of Napoleon and
entitled the work "The Greatest Homosexual."2 An art critic called
another portrait by the artist, a nude depiction of his sexagenarian
mother-in-law, "a picture of genuine nastiness couple [d] with false
charm."3 Despite the general distaste and caustic reviews of his con-
troversial works, Rivers showed promise early in his career.4 He
travelled in the same circles as dozens of famous artists, writers, and
filmmakers in the New York arts scene.5 Some critics would con-
tend that Larry Rivers never achieved his artistic potential-he fell
from his high pedestal as a new artist who challenged societal mo-
res-to a tired hack, whose assemblages of collage and caricatures
1. See Ken Johnson, Portraits Shockingly Intimate a Half-Century Ago Now Assume a
Softer Patina, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2008, at E28 available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/08/15/arts/design/15rive.html?fta=y (finding initial reception of Riv-
ers's nude portrait of his sexagenarian mother-in-law "violated a squeamish high
culture's rules of visual and moral decorum"); see alsoJohn Perreault, Larry Rivers:
A Cautionary Tale, ARTOPIA, (Sept. 1, 2008, 6:32 P.M.), http://www.artsjournal.
com/artopia/2008/09/larry_rivers-gone-but still-he.html (recognizing Rivers's
parody ofJacques Louis-David's Napolean entitled "The Greatest Homosexual" as
"the best art joke ever"); see id. (contrasting Rivers's "History of the Russian Revolu-
tion" as "complex and truly magnificent" while simultaneously deriding his later
works as marked by false starts and "academic drawing").
2. Holland Cotter, Larry Rivers: 1950s/1960s-Refurbished Reputation for a Nervy
Painter, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2009, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/09/07/arts/design/07rivers.html.
3. Johnson, supra note 1 (quoting critic for Arts Magazine, Leo Steinberg's re-
ception of "Double Portrait of Berdie").
4. See id. (noting that Rivers' version of Washington Crossing the Delaware was
purchased by Museum of Modern Art and Tibor de Nagy gallery hosted artist's
solo show); see alsoJohnson, supra note 1, at E28 (describing Rivers's early works as
"terrifically fertile, energetic, and daring").
5. See Kate Taylor, Artist's Daughter Wants Videos Back, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2010,
at Cl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/08/arts/design/08rivers.
html [hereinafter: Taylor] (providing that Rivers was acquainted with Leonard
Bernstein, Jasper Johns, Kenneth Koch, Terry Southern, Allen Ginsberg, Gregory
Corso, and Pierre-Dominique Gaisseau).
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of famous historical paintings felt "thin," overwrought, and
"formulaic."6
Even after the artist's death, his works continued to test the
bounds of propriety. In July 2010, New York University ("N.Y.U.")
purchased a collection of archives from the Larry Rivers Founda-
tion for an undisclosed price.7 The archive contains mostly artifacts
from the artist's life, including letters of historical import that detail
Rivers's relationships with famous twentieth-century artists and writ-
ers.8 While the collection is lauded for its historical significance, it
also includes a widely-criticized forty-five minute compilation of a
film series entitled "Growing."9
Rivers began interviewing his prepubescent daughters when
they were ages eleven and thirteen. 10 He asked them questions
about their developing breasts and continued to expose them to
the prying eye of the camera throughout their teenage years." The
shots portrayed the daughters naked or topless, with close-ups of
one daughter's genitals.12 Rivers's daughters have expressed to the
media that the film has caused them irreparable harm.' 3 Both
daughters are currently in their mid-forties, and one of his daugh-
ters, Emma Tamburlini, has demanded that the tapes be removed
6. See Johnson, supra note 1, at E28 ("After the '60s [Rivers's] mix of facile
draftsmanship, loose brushwork and clever collage and assemblage would look in-
creasingly thin, formulaic, and derivative.").
7. See Taylor, supra note 5, at C1 (indicating that archives, including "Grow-
ing" were purchased by N.Y.U. for its special collections from Larry Rivers
Foundation).
8. See id. (reporting collection contains correspondence between Rivers and
famous artists such as William de Kooning and Andy Warhol, and writers John
Ashbery and Frank O'Hara).
9. See id. (quoting director of N.Y.U.'s Fales Library and Special Collections
comment that archive has special import to rare-book world and finding that
N.Y.U. purchase was controversial because archive contains footage of artist's na-
ked daughters in various states of undress).
10. See Tracy Clark-Flory, Child Porn or Coming-of-Age Film?: Controversial Footage
that Artist Larry Rivers Shot of His Naked Adolescent Daughters is headed to NYU, SALON.
coM, July 8, 2010, available at http://www.salon.com/life/broadsheet/2010/07/
08/larry-rivers childporn (describing contents of "Growing," which includes
"close-up shots of one daughter's genitals and detailed commentary by Mr. Rivers
on the girls' changing bodies").
11. See id. (finding Rivers captured footage of his topless daughters "every six
months for five years").
12. See id. (describing contents of film and speculating that possession of film
series may subject holder to criminal child pornography charges).
13. See Taylor, supra note 5, at C1 (indicating Rivers' daughter blames film for
her bout with anorexia at age sixteen and later need for psychotherapy). Although
consent is irrelevant to statutory elements of child pornography possession, effects
of the film seem all the more troublesome because the girls were filmed against
their will. See id. (citing Tamburlini's comments that if she ever refused to be
filmed, her father would call her "uptight and a bad daughter").
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from the archive and returned to her permanently.14 N.Y.U. re-
cently responded by refusing to accept the tapes from the Larry
Rivers Foundation.' 5 The Foundation has denied Tamburlini's pre-
vious requests to have the tapes destroyed, so it is not likely to sur-
render the tapes in the near future.16
A look into Rivers's past suggests that the film was not an inno-
cent artistic foray, but was instead a manifestation of abuse. His
autobiography, What Did I Do?, reveals that he was forced to per-
form a sex act when he was six years old.1 7 Rivers also recounts that
he had a sexual affair with a fifteen-year-old girl when he was in his
forties.' 8 Furthermore, Rivers verbally berated his daughters dur-
ing the filming of "Growing," forcing them to participate in the
film.19 Though these events do not serve to excuse Rivers for creat-
ing pornographic content, they may shed some light on his motiva-
tions for creating this controversial film.20
Although Rivers's critics may have called the "Double Portrait
of Berdie" an affront to polite society for its tasteless depiction of a
nude, aged woman, replete with wrinkles and fat, they could not
call the portrait criminal.21 While some would consider it tasteless
to paint a nude portrait of a person's sixty-year old mother-in-law,
14. See id. (indicating Emma Tamburlini wants tape removed and returned to
her).
15. See Kate Taylor, University Doesn't Want Film of Artist's Children, N.Y. TIMES,
July 17, 2010, at C3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/17/arts/de-
sign/17rivers.html [hereinafter: Taylor II] (indicating that N.Y.U. has spoken with
Larry Rivers Foundation and wants to exclude tapes from archival purchase).
16. See id. (recounting that Tamburlini previously asked Larry Rivers Founda-
tion to destroy tapes, but Foundation declined, citing Foundation's preponderant
duty to protect collection material). The foundation board has not yet confirmed
what they intend to do with the tapes, but will be thoughtfully considering the
issues. See id. (noting board decision regarding tapes).
17. See Taylor, supra note 5 (relating that eleven-year-old neighbor forced Riv-
ers to perform sex act).
18. See id. (concerning information in Rivers's autobiography about his adult
sexual encounters with fifteen-year-old girl).
19. See id. (quoting Emma Tamburlini "if she objected [to being filmed] ...
she was called uptight and a bad daughter").
20. See infra notes 64, 77-80 and accompanying text for a discussion advancing
that the New York child pornography statute does not require a child's lack of
consent since the prosecution can hold defendant strictly liable for offense against
a person younger than sixteen years of age, subject to defendant's mistake of age
defense.
21. SeeJohnson, supra note 1, at E28 (quoting Arts Magazine critic Leo Stein-
berg's comment on "Double Portrait of Berdie" as "a picture in which genuine
nastiness couples with false charm") (describing nude portrait of Rivers's sexage-
narian mother-in-law, Berdie Burger) (quoted in original). For a further discus-
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the First Amendment protects such artistic works from censure.22 A
nude portrait of a minor, unlike a nude portrait of an adult, does
not receive the same deference; its creator can be prosecuted
under state and federal child pornography law.23
While child pornography is not protected as a legitimate form
of artistic expression under the Constitution, the dividing line be-
tween art and child pornography is difficult to ascertain. 24 For in-
stance, it would be outlandish to characterize Anne Geddes's
tender images of naked, cherubic babies surrounded by flowers as
child pornography.25 Conversely, some jurisdictions have brought
child pornography charges against parents for taking inappropriate
nude photos of their young children.26 In a famous opinion, Jus-
tice Potter Stewart of the U.S. Supreme Court wrote of pornogra-
phy, "I know it when I see it."27 Child pornography statutes attempt
to limit that subjectivity by defining particular content as child por-
nography while excluding innocuous images of nude children.28
This comment analyzes the current state of child pornography
law to determine whether criminal charges can be brought against
trusts and galleries for possessing or distributing works containing
child pornography.29 Section II provides an overview of the Consti-
tutional law cases that defined child pornography as an unpro-
22. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I (providing that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech"); see also supra note 38 and accompanying text
(discussing definition of obscenity and its exclusion of works with artistic value).
23. See infra notes 39-49 and accompanying text for proposition that child
pornography is not subject to same test as obscenity and states have wide-latitude
in prohibiting child pornography based on compelling interest in protecting chil-
dren from physical and psychological harm.
24. See Sid Smith, A Developing Controversy: Child Pornography Laws Have Chilling
Effect on Photographers, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 20, 1995, available at http://articles.chicago
tribune.com/1995-02-20/features/9502200008_1 sexual-acts-involving-children-
child-pornography-laws (discussing how father who took nude photos of his six-
year-old daughter for photography class was arrested on child pornography
charges and suggests such laws could stifle artists' protected speech).
25. See ANNEGEDDES.COM, http://www.annegeddes.com/modules/anne/gal-
leries/browse.aspx?pi-galleryid= (last visited March 8, 2011) (displaying portraits
of nude infants surrounded by a variety of idyllic landscapes, flora, and fauna).
26. See infra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing child pornography
indictment against parent for taking nude photos of six-year-old child); cf Anne
Geddes, Two Precious Miracles of Life and How They Can Inspire Us, THE HUFFINcTON
PosT (Dec. 21, 2010, 9:01 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/anne-geddes/
two-precious-miracles-of-life-b_799291.html (describing artist's subject matter and
motivation for photographing infants).
27. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
28. For a discussion of a New York case in which child pornography statute
did not penalize child nudity, see infra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 100-10 (discussing Cincinnati Contemporary Arts Center's
criminal charges under child pornography and obscenity statutes).
[Vol. 18: p. 683
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tected class of speech, distinguishing the elements of child
pornography from those of obscenity.30 Section III analyzes the
current state of New York child pornography law.3 1 Section IV com-
pares the Rivers situation with prior cases where artistic works be-
came the subject of child pornography charges.32 Section V briefly
examines how computer-generated imagery (CGI), which allows
producers to create images of children out of thin air, has displaced
prior rationales for the criminalization of child pornography.33
Section VI notes a key difficulty in shifting the proof-of-age burden
onto defendants in child pornography cases. Finally, Section VII
concludes with an assessment of how the Larry Rivers videotapes
should be characterized, and whether possessors and distributors of
such controversial works could be charged under the applicable
child pornography statutes.3 4
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF OBSCENITY LAW
AND CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
One of the rationales underlying the First Amendment was to
protect the free exchange of ideas in order to bring about political
and social change.35 Though the Supreme Court has recognized
that the First Amendment exists to protect unorthodox and contro-
versial ideas, some expressions remain outside the ambit of consti-
tutionally-protected expression because they have such little
redeeming social importance that their value is outweighed by con-
cerns of order and morality.3 6
30. For a discussion of the emergence of child pornography from obscenity
law, see infra notes 35-62 and accompanying text.
31. For a discussion of relevant New York case law, see infra notes 64-124.
32. For a further discussion of other prosecutions involving artistic works of
child pornography, see infra notes 142-163 and accompanying text.
33. For a further discussion of how CGI technologies changed the legal con-
siderations of state and federal lawmakers with respect to child pornography, see
infra notes 165-184 and accompanying text.
34. For a further discussion of whether an Art Foundation could be charged
with possession of child pornography, see infra notes 185-96.
35. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (referencing Continen-
tal Congress's protection of speech not only to promote truth, science, morality
and art but to unite people through "diffusion of liberal sentiments" to curb unjust
practices by government officials) (citations omitted).
36. See id. at 485.
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene . . . . It
has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality.
2011] 687
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The Supreme Court defined obscenity in Miller v. California.3 7
The Court held that the guidelines for determining whether a work
is obscene are:
[W]hether the average person, applying contemporary
community standards would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest, whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law,
and whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value.38
The Miller obscenity test does not apply to child pornography be-
cause the government has a compelling interest in protecting chil-
dren from victimization and abuse, and statutes banning
production and distribution of child pornography are narrowly tai-
lored to further that compelling interest.39
Rather than regulate child pornography as obscenity, the
Court held that states have a compelling interest in protecting the
physical and psychological well-being of minors.40 In contrast to
obscenity, the potential literary or scientific value of displaying a
child engaged in lewd sexual conduct is "exceedingly modest, if not
de minimis," and furthermore, this value does nothing to alleviate
the underlying harm to the child during the production and distri-
Id.
37. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
38. Id. at 24. Court defines obscene materials as works "which, taken as a
whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a
patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229,
230 (1972)).
39. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982) (holding that Miller
standard of obscenity "does not reflect the State's particular and more compelling
interest in prosecuting those who promote the sexual exploitation of children ...
[and] bears no connection to the issue of whether a child has been physically or
psychologically harmed in the production of the work"). The Court in Ferber con-
cluded that the state has a compelling interest in safeguarding the physical and
psychological well-being of minors. See id. at 756-57 (finding compelling interest in
safeguarding interests of minors). This may stem in part from the Court's defer-
ence to legislative findings indicating that children used as subjects in child por-
nography have trouble developing intimate relationships later in life, and the
Court concluded that stopping distribution is the most effective action law enforce-
ment can take to stop clandestine production of child pornography, which is "diffi-
cult, if not impossible." See id. at 758-60.
40. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756 (finding "that a State's interest in 'safeguarding
the physical and psychological well-being of a minor' is 'compelling'") (quoting
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)).
[Vol. 18: p. 683
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bution of child pornography. 41 In addition, the Court relied on
legislative findings that child pornography is detrimental to chil-
dren because images of their abuse will continue to circulate, per-
petuating the abuse throughout their adult lives. 42
Even if a work of child pornography possesses legitimate liter-
ary, scientific, political, or artistic value when considered as a whole,
such value does not diminish the State's compelling interest in pro-
tecting children from exploitation.43 In New York v. Ferber, the
Court upheld a New York statute used to convict a bookstore pro-
prietor for selling films that depicted young boys masturbating.44
The statute prohibited the knowing promotion of a sexual perform-
ance by a child less than sixteen years of age.45 The statute defined
"sexual performance" as "'any play, motion picture, photograph or
dance.'"46 Sexual conduct, as defined by the statute, included a
host of prohibited acts.47 The Court found that stopping the chain
of distribution was the most effective means for law enforcement to
address the underlying problem of child pornography produc-
41. Id. at 762-63. The Court observes that value of any literary or scientific
work depicting children engaged in sexual conduct is "exceedingly modest" and
proposing use of alternatives that would not involve use of children below statuto-
rily-defined age in those cases. See id. (noting children engaging in sexual conduct
is of little literary and scientific value). The Court reasoned that a work could have
high literary or artistic value, but could be just as harmful to the child forced to
engage in explicit sexual or lewd acts for its production, thus it is not reasonable to
regulate child pornography under traditional obscenity standards. See id. at 761
("It is irrelevant to the child [who has been abused] whether or not the material
... has a literary, artistic, political, or social value.") (internal quotations and cita-
tion omitted).
42. See id. at 759 ("[T]he materials produced are a permanent record of the
children's participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their
circulation.").
43. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761 (quoting legislative findings that "a work which,
taken on the whole, contains serious literary artistic, political, or scientific value
may nevertheless embody the hardest core of child pornography" and otherwise
legitimate purposes of nude photograph or video make no difference to abused
children portrayed therein).
44. See id. at 752 (revealing Manhattan bookstore proprietor Paul Ferber sold
two films to undercover officer "devoted almost exclusively to depicting young boys
masturbating").
45. See id. at 750-51 ("A person is guilty of the use of a child in a sexual per-
formance if knowing the character and content thereof he employs, authorizes, or
induces a child less than sixteen years of age to engage in a sexual performance.
.") (quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 263.05 (McKinney 1980)).
46. Id. at 751 (quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 263.00(4) (McKinney 1980)).
47. See id. (defining sexual conduct to include "'actual or simulated sexual
intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado-maso-
chistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals"') (quoting N.Y. Penal Law
§ 263.00(3) (McKinney 1980)).
2011] 689
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tion.48  Unlike obscenity laws, child pornography statutes are
geared towards protecting the subjects of the works rather than
audiences who view the works.49
The Court of Appeals reversed Ferber's conviction, holding
that the New York statute was overbroad, criminalizing expression
traditionally protected by the First Amendment.50 The Ferber Court
rejected this contention of overbreadth, agreeing with the respon-
dent's argument that prohibiting the distribution of obscene child
pornography was narrowly tailored enough to satisfy the state's in-
terest in protecting children from the pernicious effects of pornog-
raphy. 5 1 In upholding the law, the Court extended the
respondent's argument even further, suggesting that child pornog-
raphy laws encompassing non-obscene content did not violate the
First Amendment. 52
Additionally, the Court determined that its decision to limit
freedom of speech was not inconsistent with its other decisions that
applied content-based restrictions to speech when "the evil to be
restricted so overwhelmingly outweigh[ed] the expressive inter-
ests."53 Unlike the application of obscenity law to adult pornogra-
phy, the Ferber test does not require that child pornography appeal
to the prurient interest of the average person, that the sexual con-
duct portrayed be "patently offensive," or that the work be consid-
48. See id. at 756-761 (substantiating state's compelling interest in curbing dis-
tribution of child pornography because (1) harm to children is exacerbated by
child pornography's continued distribution, and (2) stopping distribution chain is
only way to effectively curtail production of child pornography).
49. See id. at 758 (stating legislative purpose of child pornography laws is to
protect minors' physical and psychological well-being); see also Elaine Wang, Equal
Protection in the World of Art and Obscenity: The Art Photographer's Latent Struggle with
Obscenity Standards in Contemporary America, 9 VAND. J. Er. & TECH. L. 113, 129
(2006) (discussing how child pornography laws are designed to protect subjects
whereas obscenity laws are designed to protect audiences).
50. See id. at 752-53, 773 (addressing Court of Appeals' holding that statute
encroached on medical textbooks and National Geographic by concluding that
such legitimate uses constitute such small percentage of child pornography uses
that state can cure any potential overbreadth on case-by-case basis).
51. See id. at 773 (holding that section 263.15 was not substantially overbroad
because its "legitimate reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications").
52. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760-61 (1982) ("While some States
may find that this approach properly accommodates its interests, it does not follow
that the First Amendment prohibits a State from going further."); see also id. at 773-
74 (holding instances where child pornography possesses potential literary, artis-
tic, scientific or social value amount to small fraction of material within statutes
and can be cured on case-by-case basis).
53. Id. at 763-64.
[Vol. 18: p. 683
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ered as a whole.54 Yet, statutes punishing child pornography are
subject to the same rigorous standards as those punishing obscenity
and other forms of unprotected expression.5 5 For instance, a state
statute seeking to impose criminal punishment for child pornogra-
phy must be limited to visual media, restricted to depictions of sex-
ual conduct by children below a statutorily-defined age, and
contain a narrowly defined description of the prohibited sexual
conduct.56 Thus, under Ferber, child pornography became a new
category of constitutionally unprotected speech.57
Furthermore, Broadrick v. Oklahoma58 acknowledged that when
the regulated activity involves conduct in addition to speech, the
overbreadth of the statute must be substantial for the statute to be
declared constitutionally invalid.5 9 This decision paved the way for
the Court in Osborne v. Ohio6o to apply the "substantial overbreadth"
test to conduct regulating pure speech.6' The Ferber court applied
this rationale, concluding that New York Penal Law Section 263.15
did not suffer from overbreadth sufficient to render it unconstitu-
tional; the instances in which a child may be depicted engaging in
sexual conduct for legitimate purposes are so few and far between
that they are insubstantial. 62 Thus, states' compelling interest in
54. See id. at 761 (finding that whether work, taken as whole, appeals to pruri-
ent interest of average person has no bearing on whether children have been
harmed in its production).
55. See id. at 764 (imposing Constitutional limits to statutory prohibition of
child pornography).
56. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764-65.
There are, of course, limits on the category of child pornography....
[T]he conduct to be prohibited must be adequately defined by the appli-
cable state law, as written or authoritatively construed ... [and] limited to
works that visually depict sexual conduct by children below a specified
age. The category of "sexual conduct" proscribed must also be suitably
limited and described.
Id. (emphasis in original).
57. See supra notes 40-45 (discussing how Ferber court's test for child pornog-
raphy does not include Miller third prong for works with social value).
58. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
59. See id. at 615 (providing that regulations of speech should be substantially
overbroad "particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved" to vio-
late First Amendment).
60. 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
61. See id. at 112 (holding that scope of statute regulating pure speech "does
not render it unconstitutional unless its overbreadth is not only 'real, but substan-
tial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep'") (quoting
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615).
62. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 772-74 (1982) (demonstrating that
infringement on protected uses of child pornography would constitute "[no] more
than a tiny fraction" of materials implicated by statute and not enough to generate
concern of constitutional overbreadth); see also infra notes 58-59 and accompany-
2011] 691
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protecting children from the harmful effects of pornography
formed a juncture that divided child pornography from categoriza-
tion under the obscenity laws that regulate adult pornography.63
III. CURRENT NEW YORK CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW
A. Analysis of New York Penal Law Article 263.00
The determination of whether the Larry Rivers Foundation
could be charged with possession of child pornography for the film
series, "Growing," requires an examination of the governing New
York statutes and case law.64 New York Penal Law Section 263.16
criminalizes "promoting a sexual performance by a child," for any-
one who, "knowing the character and content thereof . . knowingly
has in his possession or control any performance which includes
sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age."65 The Su-
preme Court reviewed the New York state statute, holding that
states can prohibit child pornography that does not meet the legal
definition of obscenity without violating the First Amendment.66
Subsequently, the New York Court of Appeals defined this sec-
tion to encompass the acquisition of child pornography for per-
sonal use in People v. Keyes. 6 7 There, the prosecution charged the
defendant with violating New York Penal Law section 263.15 for
procuring child pornography through the mail and in his home
from an undercover officer.68 The defense argued, albeit unsuc-
cessfully, that the term "procure" should be construed with refer-
ing text (discussing criteria used to determine whether speech statute is
overbroad).
63. See Wang, supra note 48, at 129 (concluding obscenity laws encompass
wider variety of works than child pornography, and Miller's third prong is irrele-
vant to latter).
64. See Contact Info, LARRY RVERS FOUND., http://www.larryriversfoundation.
org/contact.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2011) (listing location of Larry Rivers Foun-
dation as Bridgehampton, New York); Taylor, supra note 5, at C3 (indicating that
N.Y.U. recently returned "Growing" series to Larry Rivers Foundation, which re-
tains possession of videos).
65. N.Y. Penal Law § 263.16 (McKinney 2008).
66. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 774 (holding New York state statute prohibiting non-
obscene child pornography did not violate First Amendment).
67. 75 N.Y.2d 343, 348 (N.Y. 1990). "Understood in this sense, the term 'pro-
cure,' as used in Penal Law § 263.00(5) defines 'promote' for the purposes of Pe-
nal Law § 263.15 as simply the acquisition of child pornography, whether for
personal consumption or for distribution of others" which easily encompassed de-
fendant's conduct. Id.
68. See id. at 345 (enumerating charges brought against defendant who re-
quested images of underage boys engaged in sexually explicit poses from under-
cover officer).
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ence to other terms in the statute.69 The appeals court opted for a
plain-meaning construction of the term "procure," which included
acquisition of child pornography for the purpose of distribution to
others. 70 The court also cited the legislative intent to "eradicate
child pornography in all its forms" in favor of a broad construction
that would penalize passive consumers of child pornography.71 Al-
though the defendant in Keyes presented the alternative argument
that he had a constitutional right to possess child pornography in
his home, the court did not address this matter since the defendant
was charged with procuring, and not possession of child pornogra-
phy. 7 2 Under New York state law it is a criminal offense to obtain
child pornography for personal use, even if the individual did not
play any part in producing or distributing the work of child pornog-
raphy.7 3 After Keyes, whether spontaneous possession of the mate-
rial in a person's own home, without making an acquisition effort,
would be enough to convict an individual under the New York stat-
ute has yet to be determined.74
The Supreme Court's decision in Osborne v. Ohio75 resolved the
issue of whether the state can lawfully penalize possession of child
pornography in the home. There, the United States Supreme
Court upheld an Ohio statute that prohibited possession of nude
69. See id. at 346 (acknowledging defendant's argument to apply rule of nos-
citur a sociis to determine meaning of "procure").
70. See id. at 347-48 (recognizing that while County Court derived definition
of "procure" from other words in statute, Court of Appeals properly held that con-
duct within plain and natural meaning of statute could be penalized, which in-
cludes definition meaning "to get possession of: obtain, acquire").
71. Id. at 348 (finding that legislative history "contains no suggestion that the
consumers of [child pornography] were to be excluded from the reach of those
measures").
72. See id. at 349 (dismissing defendant's argument that right of privacy gives
him constitutional right to possess child pornography in his home because defen-
dant was charged with procurement of child pornography and not possession). The
defendant cited Stanley v. Georgia for the proposition that even though defendant's
obscene materials were prohibited under the constitution, defendant could not be
convicted of criminal possession because of his constitutional right of privacy to
possess the material in his own home. See Keyes, 75 N.Y.2d at 349 (citing Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1969) (noting obscenity prohibited under
Constitution).
73. See id. at 347-48 (reversing trial court's holding that New York legislature
did not intend to penalize passive consumers of child pornography based on legis-
lature's intent to ban child pornography in all its forms and addition of term "pro-
cure" to statute, which is defined as "to obtain, acquire" in order to direct statute at
consumers, and not merely manufacturers and distributors).
74. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (explaining that defendant's
procurement of child pornography was deciding factor in Keyes decision).
75. 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
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photographs of a minor.76 The Ohio statute differed from the New
York statute at issue in Keyes, penalizing lewd exhibitions of child
nudity rather than lewd exhibitions of the genitals.77 The Court
concluded that the Ohio statute was not unconstitutionally over-
broad because the Ohio Supreme Court had further narrowed the
definition of nudity to encompass a lewd exhibition or graphic fo-
cus on the genitals, where the person depicted is not the child or
ward of the person charged under the statute.78 The Osborne Court
revealed that the state had a compelling interest in banning the
possession of child pornography because pedophiles can use those
materials to induce other children to engage in sexual activity, and
a ban would encourage possessors of child pornography to destroy
the material. 79 Thus, the Court upheld the Ohio child pornogra-
phy statute penalizing individuals for possessing child pornography
in the home.80
76. See id. at 109-13 (holding that Ohio statute prohibiting possession of nude
photographs of minors is not unconstitutionally overbroad). The court rejected
the defendant's reliance on Stanley v. Georgia because the state's reason for regu-
lating possession of obscenity-to prevent it from poisoning the minds of view-
ers-because that was an impermissible, paternalistic interest, whereas the state of
Ohio had a compelling interest in regulating child pornography. See id. at 109
(citing Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-58 (1982)). In contrast, the court acknowledges
compelling reasons for prohibiting possession of child pornography. See id. at 109-
10 (noting rationale for prohibiting possession of child pornography). To the de-
fendants argument that the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad because it
criminalizes constitutionally-protected conduct, the Court counters that over-
breadth is not substantial enough to warrant facial invalidation because the other
areas of Ohio law define the terms "nudity" and "minor" with specificity, and re-
quire an element of scienter as set forth in Ferber. See id. at 112-14 (analyzing over-
breadth analysis).
77. See id. at 112-13 (indicating that although depictions of nudity without
more are constitutionally protected speech, here Ohio statute is not facially over-
broad because Ohio Supreme Court restricted definition of nudity to lewd exhibi-
tion of nude child who is not person's child or ward). The Ohio court's
interpretation thus excluded possession or viewing of innocuous photos of naked
children from the statutory prohibition. See id. at 114 (excluding possession or
viewing naked photos).
78. See id. at 113 (concluding Ohio statute is not overbroad because Ohio
Supreme Court sufficiently narrowed definition of nudity by interpretation (citing
State v. Young, 37 Ohio St. 3d 249, 252 (Ohio 1988)); cf New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 765 (1982) (holding that depictions of nudity, without more, are consti-
tutionally protected forms of expression).
79. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111 (introducing rationale that ban on possession en-
courages destruction of child porn which is related to compelling interest in pro-
tecting child victim from permanent record of abuse); see also supra note 7 and
accompanying text (citing Attorney General's Commission on Pornography for ev-
idence that children are coerced to engage in sexual activity with adult by images
of other children engaging in same types of activity).
80. See supra notes 48-54, 74 and accompanying text for discussion of states'
compelling interest in protecting children from pernicious effects of pornography,
and how circulation perpetuates the abuse.
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As one element of a child pornography prosecution, a child's
age poses an evidentiary challenge to the prosecution, and a good
faith, mistake-of-age defense can absolve a defendant in certain situ-
ations.81 To hold an individual strictly liable under New York Penal
Law § 263.16 of the possession statute, the prosecution must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the child performer was under six-
teen years of age.82 Obtaining proof of the performer's age poses a
hefty burden to the prosecution, where the child is "likely to be
anonymous and incapable of identification."83 The defendant can
then assert an affirmative defense by showing a good faith, reasona-
ble belief that the performer was over the age of sixteen.84 In addi-
tion to establishing the age of the performer, the prosecution must
also establish that the defendant had knowledge of the character
and content of the material possessed.85
The content of the film "Growing" determines how persons
who view, possess or distribute the film will be treated under New
York law. The New York child pornography statute prohibits "pro-
motion of a sexual performance of a child ... which includes sexual
conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age."8 6 The statute also
defines sexual conduct to include "lewd exhibition of the geni-
tals."8 7 The definition of "lewd exhibition of the genitals" under
New York law depends upon a lower court's decision interpreting
this term. 8 The term can be ambiguous, but the lower threshold
81. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (explaining challenges to
prosecution under possession statute and describing affirmative defense to such
charges).
82. See New York v. Gilmour, 678 N.Y.S.2d 436, 439 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (rec-
ognizing New York state legislature meant to hold persons who know content and
character of sexual performance strictly liable for possessing child pornography,
inferred from legislature's inclusion of mistake of age as defense under N.Y. Penal
Law § 263.20).
83. See id. (highlighting prosecution's obstacles to prove performer's age be-
yond reasonable doubt as required to support conviction).
84. See id. (acknowledging mistake of age defense under N.Y. Penal Law
§ 263.20 can absolve defendant of charges if shown by preponderance of evidence
standard).
85. See id. at 439 (recognizing plain language of statute applies scienter re-
quirement to character and content of visual or performance art); cf United States
v. X-citement Video, 513 U.S. 64 (1994) (holding that where federal statute listed
no element of scienter, scienter element applied to sexually explicit nature of ma-
terial and age of performer as well).
86. N.Y. Penal Law § 263.16 (McKinney 2008).
87. See N.Y. Penal Law § 263.00 (McKinney 2008) (defining "sexual conduct"
as "actual or simulated sexual intercourse, oral sexual conduct, anal sexual con-
duct, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of
the genitals").
88. See People v. Pinkoski, 300 A.D.2d 834, 837-38 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (con-
sidering child's pose as relevant to lewdness definition).
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of the definition excludes depictions of nude children without
some additional context or expression to imply lewdness.89 Various
news articles confirm that the "Growing" series produced by Larry
Rivers contains video footage of the exposed breasts of Rivers' two
daughters, Gwynne and Emma, beginning when they were ages
thirteen and eleven, and also includes up-close shots of one daugh-
ter's genitals.90 Rivers's daughters were both under the age of six-
teen when he began filming them, thus both daughters meet the
statutory definition of "child."9'
The New York Supreme Court held in People v. Pinkoski92 that
exposure of a minor child's bare chest and buttocks did not consti-
tute a "lewd exhibition of the genitals" within the statutory defini-
tion of sexual conduct.93 The photos that formed the basis of the
indictment in Pinkoski were of a six-year-old girl with her bare chest
and buttocks exposed.94 On appeal, the court decided to reinstate
counts of child pornography charges based on a photo of the same
girl with her pants down to her ankles and her right hand on or
near her groin area in close proximity to the genitalia.95 There, the
judge did not properly instruct the jury on the proper definition of
the term "lewd."9 6 The Appellate Division reinstated the counts be-
cause a grand jury could conclude that an image of the child touch-
89. See, eg., John Quigley, Child Pornography and the Right to Pivacy, 43 FLA. L.
REv. 347, 385 (1991) ("[I]t is unclear how a 'lewd exhibition of the genitals' differs
from any other depiction of the genitals" but prohibition can not constitute "any
depiction of nude children" without encroaching upon constitutionally-protected
speech.).
90. See Taylor, supra note 5, at C1 (elaborating on contents of film, "Grow-
ing"). The article also compares Rivers' film to other photographic works of nude
children and concludes that "[i]n Rivers's case the material seems more overtly
sexual, including close-up shots if one daughter's genitals . . ." Id.
91. See Clark-Flory, supra note 11 (noting that Rivers's daughters were ages
eleven and thirteen when he began filming them).
92. 300 A.D.2d 834 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
93. See id. at 836-37 (upholding dismissal of grand jury indictment and refus-
ing to imply statutory provision where legislature defined sexual conduct in four
different ways, none of which included exposure of bare chest and buttocks unac-
companied by lewd exhibition).
94. See id. at 834 (indicating grounds for indictment).
95. See id. at 837-38 (concluding that photo of child's genitalia was sexually
suggestive and far different from an innocuous "family photograph of a nude child
either lying on a blanket or bathing, and assuredly could not be considered an
artistic rendering of a nude").
96. See id. at 837 ("While it may have been preferable for the People to have
instructed the grand jury as to the generally accepted definitions of the term
'lewd,' the word is not so arcane as to escape the understanding of the average
juror.").
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ing herself could arouse the prurient interests of a pedophile
viewer, sufficient to constitute a lewd exhibition of the genitals.97
B. Application of Child Pornography Statutes
to the "Growing" Series
The "Growing" video contains shots of Rivers's daughters na-
ked or topless, with their bare breasts exposed to the camera, as
well as a detail view of one daughter's genitals.98 Any exhibition of
the genitals could be prurient depending on its context, but the
statute specifically prohibits "lewd exhibition of the genitals.99 In
Pinkoski, the connection between "lewdness" and "genitals" was
more readily apparent because the child had her hand near her
groin in what could be considered a sexually suggestive pose.100
The Court dismissed charges predicated on photographs of the six-
year-old victim's bare chest and buttocks because these did not con-
stitute lewd exhibitions of the genitals.101 Unlike the child in
Pinkoski, Rivers's daughters were older; throughout the course of
the film the daughters ranged in age from eleven to eighteen.10 2
The exposure of their developing teenage breasts is quite unlike
the depiction of the prepubescent six-year-old's chest in Pinkoski
because River's depiction could arouse the prurient interest, satis-
fying the Pinkoski court's definition of "lewd exhibition of the
genitals."10 3
Under Ferber, the performance's appeal to the prurient interest
would not matter because child pornography statutes are meant to
protect the child victim and not to censure the viewer. 104 The
97. See id. (asserting that photo offended "accepted standards of decency" and
"appeal[ed] to the prurient interests").
98. See Clark-Flory, supra note 10 (indicating type of nudity depicted by
video).
99. See N.Y. Penal Law § 263.00 (McKinney 2008) (including lewd exhibition
of genitals within statute's definitions of prohibited conduct).
100. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text (providing explanation of
Pinkoski decision).
101. See Pinkoski, 300 A.D.2d at 836 (finding bare buttocks and chest are not
lewd exhibitions of genitals under definition set forth in N.Y. Penal Law § 263.00).
102. See Clark-Flory, supra notes 10 (noting that Rivers began filming daugh-
ters at ages eleven and thirteen over timeframe of five years).
103. See id. at 837-38 (holding conduct that appealed to prurient interest was
lewd within statute's definition); cf supra note 82 (referencing Ferber holding that
child performance need not appeal to prurient interest or be patently offensive to
constitute child pornography).
104. See id. (convicting mother for portraying child in photographs that could
arouse prurient interest of pedophile); see also Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760-61 (1982)
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Pinkoski opinion cites Penal Law Article 245 for a definition of sex-
ual conduct that includes physical contact with a female's breast.10 5
The Supreme Court in Osborne relied on the state court's statutory
interpretation of "lewd exhibition of the genitals" when applying
the statute.10 6 Ferber merely required that states provide enough de-
tail of the prohibited conduct but did not define what constitutes
sexual conduct by a minor.107 The Ferber court did mention, how-
ever, that depictions of nudity alone are not prohibited by the con-
stitution.108 If the Rivers video contained images of the daughters
touching their breasts, this could fall within the statutory definition
of sexual conduct.109
The Rivers video is described as containing "up close shots of
one of the daughter's genitals."110 Pinkoski's reversal of the grand
jury's decision appears to depend on the definition of obscenity set
out in Miller, because the photo is being judged by "accepted [com-
munity] standards of decency" and whether the photo appeals to
the prurient interest."' Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Ferber
clarified that New York State can punish individuals for promoting
child pornography that does not rise to the level of obscenity with-
out violating the Constitution. 1 1 2
The Pinkoski court appears to achieve some middle ground,
not seeking to penalize parents for taking innocent, albeit nude,
photographs of their young children while still imposing penalties
for photographs that society would, on average, consider "prurient"
or sexually suggestive.' 13 If the "Growing" video is to come within
105. See Pinkoski, 300 A.D.2d at 837 n.3 (quoting Penal Law § 245.10 that de-
fines sexual conduct as "an act of masturbation, homosexuality, sexual intercourse,
or physical contact with the person's clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area,
buttocks, or if such person be a female, breast").
106. See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 78 (finding that Ohio statute was not overbroad
because sexual conduct had been defined by Ohio Supreme Court).
107. See, e.g., Ferber, 458 U.S at 764 (describing constitutional requirements for
child pornography statute).
108. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 at 765 (holding that depictions of
nudity, without more, are constitutionally protected forms of expression).
109. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (noting New York courts
typically define "sexual conduct" to include "lewd exhibitions of the genitals").
110. Taylor, supra note 5, at Cl.
111. Ferber, 468 U.S. at 755. The Ferber Court acknowledged "adher[ing] to
the guidelines expressed in Miller' since its decision. Id.
112. See id. at 764-65 ("A trier of fact need not find that the material appeals
to the prurient interest of the average person; it is not required that sexual con-
duct portrayed be done so in a patently offensive manner.").
113. See People v. Pinkoski, 300 A.D.2d 834, 836 (implying that additional
context is needed for images to constitute child pornography by excluding images
of bare buttocks and chest because they did not constitute lewd exhibitions of
genitals).
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the statutory definition of pornography, the images of the child's
genitalia must be accompanied by something more-a suggestive
context that appeals to the prurient interest.11 4 The Rivers footage
is also accompanied by an interview, with Rivers asking the girls
whether boys have started to notice their breasts.' 1 5 The daughters'
commentary might be sufficient; news accounts of the videos sug-
gest that the context of the conversation that accompanies the
videos is sexual in nature.1 16 The daughter's bashful admissions of
a potential crush or the awkward stares of their peers could create a
titillating element that would propel the videos from categorization
as an innocent, artistic rendering of the female body into the realm
of child pornography, punishable by statute.1 7
While the film's contents determine whether the work is child
pornography, to prosecute someone for the film would require the
state to produce evidence that the person charged "kn [ew] the
character and content" of the work, and "knowingly ha[d] in [his
or her] possession or control any performance which includes sex-
ual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age."" 8 The New
York statute defines "promote" to include "procure," encompassing
both obtaining the work without intention to distribute and mere
possession.119 The Ferber court set the constitutional bounds for
child pornography statutes by requiring an element of scienter. 20
The New York statute prohibits anyone who, "knowing the charac-
ter and content thereof," from possessing or promoting child
pornography.121
114. See Pinkoski 300 A.D.2d 834 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). (citing Ferber court for
suggesting statute that prohibits all child nudity regardless of context could be
overbroad).
115. See Clark-Flory, supra note 11 (relating that "Growing" video contains in-
terviews by Rivers in which he asks his daughters "about their breasts and whether
boys have started noticing them").
116. See id. (noting one frame contained close-ups of one daughter's genitals
in graphic focus).
117. See id. (discussing shift in public perception of taking and distributing
any photographs involving any nudity, including "bath-time photos," as acceptable
to unlawful).
118. N.Y. Penal Law § 263.16 (McKinney 2008).
119. See supra notes 71-74, 76 and accompanying text (citing cases which up-
held constitutional prohibition of procuring or acquiring child pornography with-
out intent to distribute and prohibition against mere possession of child
pornography).
120. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 ("As with obscenity laws, crimi-
nal responsibility may not be imposed without some element of scienter on the
part of the defendant") (citations omitted).
121. New York Penal Law§ 263.16. "A person is guilty of possessing a sexual
performance by a child when, knowing the character and content thereof, he
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The Larry Rivers Foundation sold the "Growing" footage along
with the rest of the archive to New York University.122 The Larry
Rivers Foundation transferred the contents of the archive to N.Y.U.
only after N.Y.U. refused to purchase the "Growing" series, imply-
ing that the films remained property of the Foundation throughout
the negotiation process.'12 Thus, a prosecutor might be able to
charge the foundation with possession of child pornography if
there was also enough evidence to convince ajury that the Founda-
tion knew what the videos contained.124 Although difficult to im-
pute knowledge on a Foundation, the prosecutor could look at
emails or formal negotiations between N.Y.U. and the Larry Rivers
Foundation, examining the Foundation's process of appraising
works, to determine if there was evidence of knowledge.
C. Collection Need Not Be Considered in Its Entirety for Child
Pornography Classification to Apply
The Larry Rivers Foundation is not the only art institution that
has come under fire for possessing works that allegedly contained
child pornography. In 1990, Cincinnati's Contemporary Arts
Center and its director were indicted on obscenity charges for dis-
playing a retrospective of the photographer, Robert Map-
plethorpe.125 An Ohio grand jury indicted the gallery director
under charges of pandering obscenity for five photographs depict-
ing sadomasochistic acts. 126 Two of the seven original photographs
in controversy were of children with their genitals exposed.127 The
knowingly has in his possession or control any performance which includes sexual
conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age." Id.
122. See Taylor, supra note 5 (indicating daughter, Emma Tamburlini de-
manded that video series be returned to her); Taylor II, supra note 15 (indicating
N.Y.U.'s subsequent return of "Growing" series to Larry Rivers Foundation after
artist's daughter complained to University).
123. See Taylor, supra note 14 (noting N.Y.U. rejected offer to purchase
"Growing" series after discovering film's contents).
124. See supra note 85 and accompanying text for discussion of scienter re-
quired by New York child pornography statute.
125. SeeJenni Sorkin, Robert Mapplethorpe: Pictures, 83 FRIEZE MAG., May 2004,
available at http://www.frieze.com/issue/review/robert-mapplethorpe-pictures
pictures (providing that police arrested gallery director, Dennis Barrie, on obscen-
ity charges for hosting Mapplethorpe's exhibition entitled "The Perfect Moment,"
which contained photographs of nude people in sexually explicit poses).
126. See Cincinnati v. Contemporary Arts Center, 57 Ohio Misc. 2d 15, 19-20
(Ohio Misc. 1990) (noting that grand jury based indictment of Dennis Barrie, cu-
rator, and Contemporary Arts Center on five sadomasochistic photographs after
viewing entire exhibit).
127. See Isabel Wilkerson, Cincinnati juiy Acquits Museum in Mapplethorpe Ob-
scenity Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 6, 1990, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/
10/06/us/cincinnati-jury-acquits-museum-in-mapplethorpe-obscenity-case.html?
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grand jury excluded these latter two photographs from the obscen-
ity indictment based on the precedent announced in Ferber, that
nude photos of minors are to be treated differently12 8 The Ohio
court did not consider whether Mapplethorpe's photographs were
child pornography; instead, the court applied the Miller test for ob-
scenity, which requires that the work "as a whole" lack serious artis-
tic merit.129
The trial court considered whether the seven photos were ob-
scene when "taken as a whole."' 3 0 The court found that each pho-
tograph must be taken as a whole under the obscenity definition,
and not considered within the entire context of the exhibition,
which included 168 photographs that were not the subjects of an
obscenity prosecution.' 3 ' The trial court excluded the two nude
pictures of minors because child pornography is subject to a more
stringent constitutional standard and does not "need [to] be con-
sidered as a whole".132 Even though the Rivers archive contains
other works that have historic and artistic significance, the artistic
importance of those works does not redeem "Growing" if a fact
finder determines that the film alone contains images of child por-
nography. 33 Thus, a foundation or gallery seeking to avoid child
pornography charges must examine and vet the entire contents of
any prospective collection, because a single video or photograph
that fits within the definition of child pornography could expose
that institution to criminal charges.134
The Cincinnati jury acquitted the Contemporary Arts Center
and its director of obscenity charges.' 35 The acquittal proved to be
("Two of the photographs showed children with their genitals exposed and were
the basis of charges the defendants had illegally displayed the images of nude
children.").
128. See Cincinnati, 57 Ohio Misc. 2d at 20 (finding obscenity test for exhibi-
tion of photographs did not include two works depicting child pornography when
considering work as a whole).
129. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (defining test for obscen-
ity to include "[w]hether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value").
130. See Cincinnati, 57 Ohio Misc. 2d at 19-20 (declaring trial court considered
photographs within context of entire exhibition).
131. See id. (noting that each photograph is to be considered separately under
definition of obscenity).
132. Id. at 20 (quoting Ferber).
133. See Pinkoski, 300 A.D.2d, at 837 (holding that works need not be consid-
ered in context of exhibition).
134. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (describing obscenity charges
against gallery and its director for Robert Mapplethorpe exhibition).
135. See Wilkerson, supra note 127, at 2 (announcing Museum and director's
acquittal in obscenity case as major victory for art and creativity).
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a pyrrhic victory for the arts world because the sensationalism of the
Mapplethorpe scandal encouraged Congress to pass a law that pro-
hibited the National Endowment for the Arts ("NEA") from subsi-
dizing obscene or indecent materials. 36 Senator Helms blamed
the government grant for helping to create the Mapplethorpe ex-
hibit, and for squandering taxpayer dollars "to subsidize filthy and
offensive art."'3 7 This signaled the start of the "culture wars" of the
1990s that created a tension between free expression and censor-
ship of the arts.138 Artists have continued to topple societal conven-
tions by transgressing moral boundaries and subjecting audiences
to images that are intended to shock and disgust. 139 These artists
have gotten more media attention since the debate centered on
NEA funding for the arts. 140 As a result of the culture war, more
artists have been charged with crimes for their works, either for ob-
scenity or child pornography.141
IV. COMPARISONS TO PREVIOUS CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
CHALLENGES TO ARTISTIC WORKS
The Larry Rivers situation bears similarities to an Alabama case
against Barnes & Noble for selling books containing images of child
pornography.142 In 1998, an Alabama grand jury indicted Barnes &
Noble on charges of disseminating child pornography for selling
Radiant Identities and The Age of Innocence.143 Alabama sought to
prosecute the bookseller because the books contained images of
136. See Sorkin, supra note 125, at 2 (revealing Helms amendment that cur-
tailed NEA funding of artistic works in wake of Cincinnati Contemporary Arts
Center indictment).
137. Wilkerson, supra note 127, at 1 (quoting Senator Jesse Helms's reaction
to Mapplethorpe exhibit).
138. See Amy Adler, The Art of Censorship, 103 W. VA. L. REv. 205, 206 (noting
culture wars began in 1989 with attack on Robert Mapplethorpe's homoerotic
nudes and Andres Serrano, known for his "Piss Christ," photo of plastic crucifix
submerged in artist's urine).
139. See, e.g., id. (citing Brooklyn Museum of Art's exhibition of dung-splat-
tered Virgin Mary and HIV-positive artist Ron Athey's performance art where he
cut incisions into another man and draped towels bloodied by incisions over
audience).
140. See id. at 207 (finding that "scandalous artist[s]" have been "dug up" for
purpose of political mudslinging over national funding for arts).
141. See id. at 207-08 (highlighting Alabama and Tennessee cases against
Barnes & Noble for two books by artists Jock Sturges and David Hamilton contain-
ing child pornography, Oklahoma prosecution of video store under child pornog-
raphy statute for renting Academy Award-Winning film The Tin Drum, and arrest of
artist Spencer Tunick for depicting nude people in public, among others).
142. See infra notes 143144-(explaining details of Barnes & Noble case).
143. See Alabama Grand jury Indicts Barnes & Noble, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 19, 1998 at
A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/19/us/alabama-grand-jury-in-
20
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol18/iss2/10
KIDDIE PORN IN THE GALLERY
nude children lying supine with their genitals exposed. 144 The au-
thor of Radiant Identities, Jock Sturges, had narrowly avoided indict-
ment for child pornography prior to the Barnes & Noble case.' 45
Supporters of Randall Terry, a talk radio host who led an anti-abor-
tion campaign called Operation Rescue, were at the forefront of
the effort to indict Barnes & Noble on charges of pandering ob-
scenity. 146 His supporters raided bookstores, and one supporter
even purchased a copy of each book, bringing them to a local po-
lice station, where officers forwarded the complaint to the attorney
general's office. 147 A similar prosecution against Barnes & Noble in
Tennessee resulted in the national bookseller's entry of a plea bar-
gain in which the prosecution agreed to drop charges if the seller
agreed to display the books above a certain height, cover them in
shrink wrap, and place them behind the counter.' 4 8
The artists embroiled in the Barnes & Noble prosecution bear
many similarities to Larry Rivers. Sturges exhibited his work in
prominent art museums including the Metropolitan Museum of
Art, the Museum of Modern Art [MoMA], and in eighteen different
galleries worldwide.14 9 Similarly, Rivers has had his work displayed
in the MoMA and his own show at a prominent New York gallery.' 50
Like the "Growing" series, Sturges's work also depicted preteen
girls with exposed breasts and genitalia. 15 1 Both Hamilton and
Sturges engaged in sexual encounters with the underage models
dicts-barnes-noble.html (reporting Alabama grand jury's indictment of Barnes &
Noble).
144. See Brian Cash, Comment, Images of Innocence or Guilt?: The Status of Laws
Regulating Child Pornography on the Federal Level and in Alabama and an Evaluation of
the Case Against Barnes & Noble, 51 ALA. L. REv. 793, 797-98 (2000) (describing
images in The Age of Innocence and Radiant Identities).
145. See Philip Hager, US. Grand Jury Refuses to Indict Photographer, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 17, 1991, at A3, available at http://articles.latimes.com/print/1991-09-17/
news/mn-2724_I-grandjury (reporting on Federal grand jury's refusal to return
indictment against Jock Sturges on child pornography charges).
146. See Doreen Carvajal, Barnes & Noble Vows to Stock Art Books Despite Indict-
ments, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1998, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/
20/us/barnes-noble-vows-to-stock-art-books-despite-indictments.html (noting
charges against Barnes & Noble in Alabama and Tennessee were brought after
protestors ransacked bookstores and tore up copies of offensive materials).
147. See id. (recounting tale of protestor who brought books to authorities'
attention).
148. See Cash, supra note 144, at 794-95 (providing details of Barnes & Noble's
plea agreement).
149. See id. at 798 (citing John D. Alcorn & Nick Lackeos, Grand Jury Indicts
Book Chain on Child Pornography Charges, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Feb. 19, 1998, at
lA (quoting Sturges)).
150. SeeJohnson, supra note 1 (discussing highlights of Rivers's career).
151. See Cash, supra note 144, at 797 (noting that "a typical Sturges photo-
graph" contains images of ten-year-old girl lying supine with "her arms out-
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they photographed.15 2 Similarly, Rivers admitted to having had an
affair with a fifteen-year-old when he was in his early forties.153
The Alabama state law at issue in the Barnes & Noble prosecu-
tion differed from the New York statute in an important way.15 4
While the Sturges photographs bear striking similarities to the
"Growing" video, Alabama's child pornography statute defines
child pornography differently. 5 5 In Alabama, "lewdness" does not
depend on the child achieving some sexually inviting pose.15 6 Simi-
lar to New York, the Alabama statute follows the decision in Ferber,
that the content depicted need not appeal to the prurient interest
or be "patently offensive" to constitute child pornography.15 7 Un-
like New York, however, Alabama adopted a special test for breast
nudity as opposed to general nudity, which requires a showing that
the breast nudity is "obscene" under the three-prong Miller test
before it is considered child pornography.15 8 For both genital
nudity and breast nudity to constitute child pornography, the de-
piction must be "lewd."' 5 9 Alabama's statute determines "lewdness"
based on the subjective intent of the photographer and the viewer's
stretched, her exposed genitals drawing the viewer's eye into the center of the
frame") (citations omitted).
152. See Cash, supra note 144, at 800-801 (describing Hamilton and Sturges
sexual relationships with minor girls); see also Taylor, supra note 5, and accompany-
ing text (recounting Rivers's affair with fifteen year old girl).
153. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (revealing Rivers's autobiogra-
phy contains admission that artist had sexual encounters with underage girls while
in his early forties).
154. See infra notes 155-63 and accompanying text (contrasting Alabama child
pornography statutory construction with New York statute).
155. See infra note 148 (defining lewdness under Alabama state penal code as
characteristic pertaining to voyeur); cf supra note 89 (explaining that New York
statute defines lewdness based on image of voyeur and not subjective lewdness of
voyeur).
156. See Cash, supra note 139, at 815 ("In Alabama, the child does not have to
assume a sexually inviting manner because 'lewdness' is, 'not a characteristic of the
child photographed but of the exhibition which the photographer sets up for an
audience that consists of himself and like-minded pedophiles.'") (citations
omitted).
157. See Cash, supra note 144, at 813-14 (finding Alabama legislature adopted
part of Ferber holding child pornography need not rise to level of obscenity to be
constitutionally prohibited).
158. See id. (finding Alabama requires breast nudity to be obscene when "the
work is considered as a whole"); see also ALA. CODE § 13A-12-190 (10) (1975) (de-
fining breast nudity as "[t]he lewd showing of the post-pubertal human female
breasts below a point immediately above the top of the areola.").
159. See Cash, supra note 144, at 815 (citing Poole v. State, 596 So. 2d 632, 637
(Ala. Crim. App. 1992)) (noting Alabama does not consider lewdness a character-
istic of child depicted, but of photographer's exhibition of photograph for audi-
ence of like minded pedophiles).
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subjective interpretations of that content.1 60 In Osborne v. Ohio, the
Court declared the statute in Stanley v. Georgial6' overbroad because
the legislative intent was to prevent lewd images from poisoning the
mind of the viewer, which the Court viewed as an impermissible
objective to justify encroachment on the First Amendment.162
The Alabama legislature's emphasis on the mind of the viewer
suggests that there are some images whose production involves the
same emotional and psychological harm to the child as child por-
nography, but which fall outside the ambit of the statute.' 63 By sub-
jecting the lewdness test to the mind of the viewer, the Alabama
child pornography statute does not seem narrowly tailored to the
compelling interest of protecting children from abuse, since nude
depictions of children for purely artistic and non-lewd purposes
could nevertheless subject a child to emotional scarring. 164
V. No CHILDREN WERE HARMED IN THE MAKING OF THIS
PRODUCTION: FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS EXTEND
TO WORKS DEPICTING IMAGES OF VIRTUAL CHILDREN
The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 ("CPPA") ad-
ded a clause to the federal child pornography law, criminalizing the
depiction of virtual, computer-generated children engaging in sex-
ual activity.165 In a lawsuit challenging the validity of the Act, Re-
spondents, members of an adult entertainment trade association,
argued that such a prohibition was overbroad, infringing upon con-
stitutionally protected speech. 16 6 The Court held that the CPPA
160. See id. ("The test .. . for 'lewd' depictions is that the sex organs be 'repre-
sented by the photographer as to arouse or satisfy the sexual cravings of a
voyeur"') (citations omitted); see also ALA. CODE § 13A-12-190 (adopting plain-
meaning definition of lewdness set forth in Alabama case law: "[o]bscene, lustful,
indecent, lascivious, lecherous"); Perry v. State, 568 So. 2d 339, 342 (Ala. Civ. App.
1990) (defining "lewd" as imputing "lascivious intent" upon viewer).
161. 394 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1969).
162. 495 U.S. 103 (1990). For a review of permissible, compelling interests for
penalizing child pornography, see supra note 76 and accompanying text.
163. See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-190 (13) (defining terms of statute).
164. See supra note 62 (holding work need not appeal to prurient interest to
constitute child pornography); but see Osborne, 495 U.S. at 112-14 (finding over-
breadth is not substantial enough to warrant facial invalidation of statute).
165. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 239-40 (2002) (evalu-
ating statute that penalized virtual child pornography under First Amendment).
The statute at issue in Ashcroft banned "any visual depiction, including any photo-
graph, film, video picture, or computer, or computer-generated image or picture
... [that] is, or appears to be, of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct." 18
U.S.C. § 2256(8) (A), invalidated by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234
(2002) (emphasis added).
166. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S at 243 (articulating respondent's argument that "ap-
pears to be" and "conveys the impression" language of statute suffer from vague-
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disregarded the Miller test for obscenity by including works of re-
deeming social value among prohibited works, even though not all
books and movies surrounding the theme of adolescent sex appeal
to the prurient interest and the work, as a whole, must lack serious
literary value. 167 The Court also recognized the state's compelling
interest in preventing the sexual abuse of children. 168 The Court
rejected the government's argument that the state had a compel-
ling interest in banning virtual child pornography for causing actual
harm to children because the causality was too attenuated.169
Additionally, the government argued that because it is difficult
to distinguish between images of real and virtual children, both
should be banned.o70 The Court reasoned that the government
cannot enact a law to ban unprotected speech when that law has a
chilling effect on a substantial amount of constitutionally protected
speech.171 The CPPA is not narrowly tailored to a compelling gov-
ernment interest because the compelling interest in Ferber depends
upon how the image was made, not its message.172 The Court inter-
preted the Ferber decision to include virtual pornography as a consti-
tutionally permissible, alternative means of expressing child
pornography, holding that not all child pornography is without
value.' 73 The Court also criticized the statute's vague wording,
which penalized videos that "convey[ed] the impression" of con-
taining sexually explicit content, because a film containing zero sex-
ual content, but which nevertheless suggested the possibility of
sexual content in its trailers or previews, would be subject to the
statutory prohibition. 174
ness and overbreadth, and will have effect of chilling works protected by First
Amendment).
167. See id. at 246 (noting theme of teenagers engaging in sexually explicit
activity "is a fact of modem society and has been a theme of art and literature for
centuries").
168. See id. at 249 (illustrating state's compelling interest in that child pornog-
raphy constitutes permanent record of abuse, whose circulation harms child, and
state's interest in closing distribution network to forestall economic motive of cre-
ating child pornography).
169. See id. at 250 (arguing causal link between virtual child porn and child
abuse is contingent and indirect).
170. See id. at 257-58 (discussing government's position that tendency of con-
fusion is compelling interest for banning virtual child porn).
171. See id. at 244 (citing Broadrick v. Oklamoma, 43 U.S. 601, 612 (1973)).
172. See id. at 251 ("[S]peech that is neither obscene nor the product of sex-
ual abuse . . . does not fall outside the First Amendment's protection.") (citation
omitted).
173. See id. (finding that Ferber recognized virtual porn as permissible alterna-
tive to actual child pornography).
174. Id. at 237.
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There are two live witnesses to attest that the Rivers video did
not contain images of virtual children.1 75 In other cases, there may
be more complex tasks to determine whether the child portrayed in
the pornographic film is real or virtual.17 6 Whether the person por-
trayed in the footage is a minor or an adult with diminutive features
is difficult to determine.1 7 7 The high court contends that such
prosecutorial difficulties should not shift the burden onto the de-
fendant to prove that the image did not use real children.17 8 An
outright ban on all images of naked children, including virtually-
rendered ones, poses constitutional overbreadth problems, encom-
passing a substantial amount of speech not tied to a compelling
government interest.179
VI. REJECTION OF FEDERAL RECORD KEEPING REQUIREMENTS
CLOSES AN OUTLET FOR PROSECUTORS TO SHIFT
THE PROOF-OF-AGE BURDEN TO THE
PORNOGRAPHY INDUSTRY
In 1988, Congress passed the Child Protection and Obscenity
Enforcement Act which required studios to keep detailed records
of each performer's age, date of birth and a list of all the aliases
that performer ever used. 8 0 The record-keeping requirements
were so stringent that pornography producers complained of hav-
175. See supra note 12 (indicating Rivers's two daughters are now adults and
could conceivably attest to fact they were used in films).
176. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 237 (discussing government's argument that vir-
tual images of nude children should be banned because of difficulty distinguishing
between images of real and virtual children).
177. See Onki Kwan, From the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act
of 1977 to The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006: How Congress Went
From Censoring Child Pornography to Censoring Protected Sexual Speech, 36 HASTINGS
CONST. L. Q. 483, 490 ("[P]roducers of sexually explicit content tend[ ] to use very
young performers to give viewers the impression that the performers were
minors.").
178. See id. (finding that government's prohibition of child pornography does
not satisfy government's compelling interest of eliminating market for child por-
nography because "few pornographers would risk prosecution for abusing real
children if fictional, computerized images," and moreover, there is no underlying
crime state seeks to prohibit when no actual children were involved in
production).
179. See id. at 237 ("[T]he defense leaves unprotected a substantial amount of
speech not tied to the Government's interest in distinguishing images produced by
real children from virtual ones.").
180. See id. (noting stringent record-keeping requirements of Child Protec-
tion law).
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ing to hire full-time staff just to deal with the record keeping re-
quirements, and they subsequently filed suit.""
Predictably, the Supreme Court ruled that the statute was un-
constitutionally overbroad for imposing documentation require-
ments on everyone along the chain of commerce.182 The American
Library Ass'n v. Thornburgh183 decision sheds light on one of the fun-
damental difficulties of prosecuting a child pornography case: find-
ing convincing evidence that the performers were minors at the
time they were depicted. 184
VII. CONCLUSION
Child pornography statutes have the design of protecting ado-
lescents like Larry Rivers's daughters from a lifetime of shame
brought on by their exhibition in a pornographic context.'85 As of
this writing, the Larry Rivers Foundation possesses the "Growing"
series, and could be indicted by a grand jury if a prosecutor were to
establish that the Foundation knew the character and content of
the "Growing" series, possessed the films, and provided that the
films contain "sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of
age."186
Proving that the Foundation knew the character and content
of the films might not be difficult because the timeline of the archi-
val purchase suggests that the Foundation either knew beforehand
or was informed of the film's contents when engaging in negotia-
tions with N.Y.U. over the purchase of the film. 18 7 The prosecutor
would also have to present evidence to convince the factfinder, be-
yond a reasonable doubt, that the girls were under the age of six-
181. See id. at 492 (reporting that pornography industry plaintiffs sought in-
junction against 1988 law).
182. See id. at 493 (invalidating statute based on overbreadth). By way of ex-
ample, the court noted that:
[A] film distributor who makes copies of films for distribution would be faced with
the often insurmountable task of having to track down personally any performer in
a 'lascivious scene,' even if the original producer of the film provided the distribu-
tor with his own documentation of the age of every performer.
Id. at 492 (emphasis in original) (quoting American Library Ass'n v. Thornburgh,
713 F. Supp. 469, 477 (D.D.C. 1989)).
183. 713 F. Supp. 469 (1989).
184. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-65 (1983) (noting statutory
prohibitions of child pornography are restricted to depictions of sexual conduct by
children below statutorily-defined age).
185. See supra notes 39-49 (explaining legislative purpose in proscribing child
pornography).
186. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
187. See supra notes 122-124 (suggesting how prosecution may be able to im-
pute knowledge of film's contents on Foundation).
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teen when they were portrayed in the film.' 8 8 This is usually
difficult in most child pornography prosecutions but may be simpli-
fied by the fact that Rivers's daughters have identified themselves as
being the underage when the footage was taken.189
The prosecutor would also have to show that Rivers's portrayal
of his daughters constitutes a "lewd exhibition of the genitals," a
showing that does not require the content to appeal to the prurient
interest, but cannot consist of the mere exposition of the daugh-
ters' nude breasts without some context for the fact-finder to infer a
lewd portrayal.190 The "Growing" series need not be considered as
a whole for the court to classify it as child pornography-if even
one frame of the film constitutes a lewd exhibition of the genitals
and the rest is innocuous, the work can still fall outside First
Amendment protection.19'
The tension between art that is protected under the First
Amendment and expression that can be prosecuted as obscenity or
child pornography is not new.'9 2 The Robert Mapplethorpe exhibi-
tion in Cincinnati showed that a museum and its director could be
indicted on obscenity charges for displaying a collection with seri-
ous artistic value, with the arguable exception of a handful of por-
traits.193 Similarly, a national chain of bookstores was indicted in
two states for promoting works that are considered by some people
as legitimate artistic works and denounced by others as egregious
examples of child pornography.19 4 Since prosecutions of child por-
nography are no longer relegated to seedy computer pornography
enthusiasts or the back rooms of adult bookstores, institutions like
the Larry Rivers Foundation are not protected from child pornog-
raphy prosecution because of their affiliation with high-flown forms
188. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (setting out standard of
proof and elements of New York child pornography statute).
189. See supra notes 86-85 (asserting New York's statutory age requirements
for child porn prosecution).
190. See supra notes 93-112 (comparing present case with Pinkoski and other
cases where court defined "lewd exhibition of the genitals").
191. See supra notes 125-132 (finding work need not be considered as whole to
be punishable as child pornography).
192. See supra notes 110-15 (describing indictment of museum director, Den-
nis Barrie, for obscenity-related charges).
193. See supra note 125-135 (detailing art museum director and museum
charged with pandering obscenity for displaying sadomasochistic photographs by
renowned artist Robert Mapplethorpe).
194. See supra notes 142-164 (describing prosecution of Barnes & Noble for
selling books containing images of nude adolescent girls).
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of artistic expression.1 9 5 Indeed, the arts as a whole are in jeopardy
and funding for the arts has been slashed because there is a large
contingency in Congress and the public that vehemently opposes
subsidizing potentially obscene works. 1 9 6
The dissemination of new, high-powered graphics technologies
is now blurring the lines between real pornographic images of chil-
dren and virtual likenesses.19 7 The Supreme Court rejected a fed-
eral statute regulating virtual images as child pornography because
the statute encroached upon areas of permissible speech and did
not address the government's compelling interest in protecting
children from abuse.s98 While the Court continues to defend areas
of constitutionally protected speech, the advent of virtual pornogra-
phy only complicates prosecutions of real child pornography by re-
quiring the state to prove that the child is real, along with the
child's age.
Attempts to ease that burden on the state have so far been met
with opposition. The task of verification a performer's age is a diffi-
cult one; the legislature cannot impose requirements on producers
and distributors of pornography to keep track of every per-
former.199 In light of these critical developments in First Amend-
ment law, arts organizations must be cautious in acquiring new
photographs or visual media that may subject them to prosecution,
and states must look for new ways to dismantle the (often under-
ground) child pornography market without encroaching upon pro-
tected speech.
Jessica N. White*
195. See supra notes 46, 54 (indicating that artistic merit will not salvage work
that otherwise contains images of child pornography because of state's compelling
interest in protecting children from abuse); cf Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973) (enumerating social value as one test to protect works that would otherwise
be obscene from state sanction).
196. See supra notes 136-138 (giving historical account of culture-wars and sen-
ator Helms effort to divest obscene or pornographic works of NEA funding).
197. See supra notes 170-172 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996.
198. See supra notes 165-174 (explaining high court's holdings in Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coalition).
199. See supra notes 180-184 (noting Supreme Court case that invalidated re-
cord-keeping requirements on pornography industry for over-breadth).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Villanova University School of Law; B.A. with hon-
ors, Swarthmore College, 2007.
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